Postmodernism and Identity Conditions for Discourses by Davis, John B.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications Economics, Department of
1-1-1999
Postmodernism and Identity Conditions for
Discourses
John B. Davis
Marquette University, john.davis@marquette.edu
Published version. "Postmodernism and Identity Conditions for Discourses," in What Do Economists
Know? New Economics of Knowledge. Eds. Garnett, Robert F. London: Routledge, 1999: 155-168.
Publisher Link. © 1999 Routledge. Used with permission.
1..0 Pe» srx.:...e»derlD.isII1 3.I1Ld id eI1L"t:i ry 
d:iscc>-.:.rses CC>lD.di "t::ie»I1LS :£c>r 
John R. Doois 
PosttrJ..odcrnist: thirrlcing rcprCscIlts a collcct:ioIl or critical perspectives on. 
Ir.J.uf.leJ.:-I.ll:::-l UiUL1.g1.l.L t11al lugelI1-t:::J:- sll,c-\r-e lTle vievv 1.111a( 1_1-..~ r-..-.oder-ni:s.t (".f~i.df-!nu~ oUr 
1:lI-.irie:djo ct=-:-~-1.a.f'" kr'c~tvvlot=::,(lg-t;=": j~ no(=:it:h("::]" t-(":-aJizal~l~ 1.""lor c:oh.~re:l."'l.t:_ On~ vvay i1."'l ",,"l'l.io;-;h 
t:l1is is ofte-:n. e:xpresse-d is iTl. t:l1e for:tr:l of .a c.rit:iq"L~e. or essentialisIrl,. .OT .-he idea that" 
SL1-ch classical cpistc.rI:101ogic:al Ilotions as true) reru,:o correct" logically I1ecessary; 
a.r::ld tile like are req-...:tir-ed fO"U.Ilciatior:1s for science aI1ci undcrstaIlding . .l\/.I.a::ny post-
rrl.oci("':;rr1.ists doul"")t 1:1""la.:t: these rl-()·tiOTlS are ultiII1a.Lely viaLle.. aIH.-i argue Lhal l1.1ey 
ra.ll.l.oe.r rLlIU: . :::LiLl-li iLL .all aLLlliurila.riaJ:.l allel do.gTna.1.ic n"'7J.nnt=':t~ t.C~· S'Jl-:lr)-f-e::=:.s -cli:!Scc,"lll-ses 
su..bversive of :rn.oder:n. bureau.c.rat:ic ra.1:ion..ality. Esser:t.ria.lisTr1.;> it is further a.rg-t.."l.ed.~ 
YT1.istakcn..ly makes o-ur i:n.tcllcctu.al. ideal t:hat of a co~plctc an.d syst:eIrl..a.tic. 
represc::n..t:a..tiO.Il. of "the ~orld4 But intellectual a.cti:vity on. a.n.y can.did rea.d.iTI..g~ post-
n· .. ·o·cl~T'n1:s1:-;. in:o:;.i:o:;.l.~ r~en~cl:s unc]c=::cida.l--,iliry:> rllsorrl..-:r:> 21..r:tr] i ... l-r]ctcrl.""l. .... i ....... a..cy <J"l ........... l""l.c ("TI ...... r. 
haTl.ci:> aTl.d oV'crde""terrn.iIlaricH"1 aI.1.ct rivalry ur.l. t..l.l.e uLJ.l.l::::I.:' Tl.l..a.L is.Jo vve: are l .... HJt..l.1. 
un.a..ble to ever really settle :rn.os1: thin.gs irl. liIe, artd.. also 1....l..1l.a..ble t:o really :n..a.rrovv 
th.e r.a.n.ge 014 corn..peti.n..g discourses o.n. ""'V"irtually a.:O,y giverl. suqject matter. 
1. thin.k this critiq"l.:l.c ............ ,d .. h . ::Iablc aJ.."1ci i1::I.sightflli in. .ITI..a.n.y respects_ It has been vvcll 
<...leveluIJe.<...1 by a v.cll:'ie.ly of" CUIJ.t ..... ·j.lJoutu.r:';-$ aC.I'c:tss n .... a.ny con[.c=::n"ll"")c-:-u'.;;J·J-Y di:<:>cirJoline~.>1 
a:tld is per~l;l.a.sive "in .::::t. varip.l.y of "'-'Vays to. :an. in.crea.sirl.g nLl.rn.h~r of" thinkers.> 
ir1.cludin...~ ma.ny tra...in..ecl in.. an..d still largely sy.rn..pat:het:ic. to rr:l.oder:n.ist tc.:n.e.t:s. In. 
this cha.ptcr I arr:l. clllcfly i.n.1:erested in t:h.e future t:::rajectory 01 post:rr:Locler:n.is:n:::J..!, 
espec.ially a.s Ll:.te elIorls or its prOp0.1.le..n.t:s arc dc.crc.a..s:lJ.""J..gly cii .. -cc:t:cd tovvard 1:J""l.C 
c:.ritiC":p:t~ oT l.""l. ...... od...-:: r"l""1.isa-n. -vv:i"t:l1 tl.l.e ::il..l.ccess clJ:.l."-{ g:r·u'-"VUl.g accelJolarJ.c.e 01 lll.al 
<.::.:rit.i£..lLl.e aIJ.Ll .rI.l..Ure a.llr..H:~Ll al e.xl..Jla.Il'.<-l.( j'ons o·r l ... ·n-..v {']i:=..c:cUJ t~~e::::;. rLJ nc:1.icJf'" •. "-:-1 
gen.erate n..e~ tho"U..ght. Surely aIle 01 1:he key perspectives postr.noclern.jsrn. offers 
is the idea. that thcrught is COTl.ti.n..u..cH.l.s1y dyn.arn..ic. a:n.d ope.n. e.:n.decl rather th.a:n. 
a..b ....... a..ys c.o.ll..vcrgin..g to~a..rd a. sin.gle set: o-f- static trLlth.s~ the :t:rl.oclern.ist idea.L ..is it. 
I.hen t.oo n"ll.Jch '-"~J a:=.:.k (i-H' l11l't:he:.- ana.lysis. of"" tl"1.is clyl.~an.""J.ic:al l"")o"-oc:~s.s an..cl Tor 
disc"l..."lssiorl.. of~ vvhat: ""this ""'I.:U::t.-SYS1:e.rX1""' ll.l.volves:? S-U-I.t:l:.t::: TJousl.lT.l.L..u_ler.I.l.is:ls rr.l.ig].l.L say 
tb.a.t: it is in..cleed too .rrn . ..1.c.h .. that vv-e Carl. o:n1y record. :rn.or:n.en.t:s of l....l..I1decid..a..bilit:-y; 
d.isorder", a..n..d irl..deter:rn..irt.a.c.y:> a.n.d that c.pistc.n-..ologica.l n..ihilisrn. is aTJ.. in.cv:itablc 
a"1..""J..d c"Vc.J.""J.. l:lcaJ.thy "l.Tl.ll.""J..cisct. 
I I'-ejecl Ll.1.is vievv ru.' l--vvu ~~e2l.!':lC~r"$!, Ot ... e:: 11-'-p"CJr-oP-1~i.cal a.nc] nnlf': !"""Jt-a.c:t·ic:a.1. Fir~t:!' 
t.h.eoretically speak.in..!I5", it: seern..s tha.t: the t:opic of c.oTIl.petir:lg 3..n.d irl.cC:.HTJ.IIl.eI.1..s .... l.ra.te 
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discourses, whether at a point in time 01 across till_1C, is a subject which we can 
cohe.rently investigate in analyzing how people disagree ""ith ()ill-! (lJ1tltlLt:l'. Th.i~ 
topic is the chief theme of thi~ r:hapt.r:r. Second, prar:tically xp~aling, it seems 
ilnperalive [rom a prugrcj:ijyc JX'litical point of view thM pOfItmori.cruist& learn 
bow to defelld (JpellIH':~s, pluralism, ami lolerance in discourse against reac-
tionary form!; of modernism. Doing thi~, Ilowevr:I', .lll'\iolvcs both showing' dearly 
and reasonably persuasively how morl~rni~m c.an be morally .rmn politically 
unhealthy for society; and also showing that there exists a handful of "essentials" 
underlying the non-anar'chic play of competing di~L:Uurscl) iliat explain how a 
posnnode:rn world is livable. This topic is a set:oIldary them.e of this chapter 
touchcd upon in the last section belm¥. 
1Iy position :might then be best put as holding that nihilism - or the view that 
we can only record mOIlleuts of undecidability1 disorder:, and illdelerminacy - is 
misguided, hut th8t what might altr:rnatively be termed principl"ll relalivism - as 
will be set forth here - is meaningful and desirable. In wh;.jt follmv!'; T tty to inves-
tigate conditions that might fulfill and ciJaractL::l'l:';c a principled relativism, and 
then turn to look critically Oil jJosunoderni"t njhi1i~m. In the [:m;t s-t'.clion, a. 
clilemma IS first pos~rl filT postrIl(){l .. rnisl di~(;Ow'se analysis thal I sugg't:sL derives 
from its past path of dcvdopmcnt :1..'\ a, R~t of ideas critical of morl~rni;;m. In the 
second section, Olle mcal18 of addressing this dilemma is set out -in terms of a 
discusslOlI or whaL I Lefm identity conditions for rnscour&:S. In the third section, 
I tnrn In market exc.hange models used to ~lllc.i(lat.f: interaction ben'VeeTl 
discourses to give a specifically economic application of the idea of identity 
conditions for discourses, and then reexamine the original dilemma and its 
suggested solulioll [rulIl chis new vantage point. In thl:: Lilla! section, I briefly 
address the i;/":conoary th~me of the chapter, argl.l~ iTl favor llf principled rela-
tivism and against nihilism, and make a number of eonc111oing remarks about 
poliLical- ethical issues that postrnout:I"uism rai::;es against modernism. 
A postrn.odernist non-conunumcation dile:nun.a. 
III Ule ·wllecLion of papers from the 1994 conference "Pluralism -in Economics: 
The(lr)~ Hislory and Methodology" (Salanti and Screpallti 1996) in Dcrgarmo, 
Tt<l.l)~ Warren Samuds argues - correctly in my VifW - r.hat alternative economic 
methodologies each possess their «0\'Vll internal limitation and theTe is no single, 
tUlequivocal~ condmive rnela-prin<.:ivk" upon which we can rely to choose 
among those methodologiei; (SamlH~ls 19%: 67). That economic Hl(~lhodlJllJgi:-;ts 
have in t.hf" past sought some "single, tUlequivoc::UJ conclusive mefa-prin-r:iplr." 
may lx: due to a. mistaken view of , .... hat the application of philosophical concepts 
La economics can accomplislL A IIluuewisl "jew of the matter would have it that 
philo..,>ophical ideas can provide firm) IHljlrohlrJIlaLic foundations for ecuIlUHlic 
ones, and that philosophical ideas onc~ gra~p~c.I ar~ rdatively llncorrtn.lV~rsial 
and convincing. A jJusunodcrnist 'view of the matter might have it that philo-
sophical jdeas arc complex all.d problematical) and that ulcil' u~c js bette!' seen as 
shm'lilalld reference to entire philosophical the(,l\"ie~, etch or wlii(:ll possess 
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strengths and wcakne.';ses relative Lo competing theories and lite philosophical 
ideas that summa.rize ilielIl. Given thal philmophkal JebaL .. appt:an In h<lv~ 
all the characleristics of an l.mdecidahle exchange, it g~emg thar. S:lmll~lg is 
correct in infen;ng that prescriptivist economic methodologies in the 
Poppel'lall-LakaLosian lraJilioIl are rnisguiclcd in searehlllg for "the principles of 
kUlrvvlt:(lgl. fJnilJlsilioTl which IWTmlt aCClJT<lJt' identification, description and 
explanat.ioll of t'h~ ~'lbject" (p. (8). 
A second, stronger claim Samuels makes is that "there is a hmdamcntal, 
tautological relationship between the assumed principles of l.'lOwlcdgc acquisi-
LiolJ awllhe knowledge which is produced" (1" 68). Perhaps "tautological" is too 
strong a tP.rm heTe, but it mllSt at least he close to the sense of Samuels' position, 
which is also expressed in terms of an idea ,-vidcly accepted among postmod-
ernists that one cannot ~~step out" of olle's O\\lll discow'st; Lhal is, l.here is 
something inherendy contradictory about the idea that on~ might he of!ISJched 
from the way ODe sees things. I think that there is a dilemma here that results 
Ii'om 'C-OUjUllliug' lh~ second propusiLion lhal knowledge L-; ,c;omt"l1ow tied to it3 
conditions of pl'(jductloll Lu Ule VroPUSi!.iOH in lbe previous paragraph Lhat (here 
are no ullequivol~l rrJt:[a-disc()ur.~cs. This may Sl:(~HI oeId, SiflC~ on first glance 
the tvlO propmitiom R~~m to he: mllt,lHl.lly ~llpporting. I.Cl: mc: then cxp<lnd llIxm 
and reconstruct Samuels' case in an attempt to bring out what I believe to be the 
clilernrna in question. In his view: 
knowledge is tied to its conditions of production; and 
2 there arc many distinct discourses on any given su~jcct (because the condi-
tions of knowledge production are diverse). 
From thi" it fo11o-w8 that: 
~ Ilu-;n-~ t:flTl h~ TlO lllliqll~ mt:'t;-J-di~cOl1r!:>e on ;my sl.lbject. 
But from this one might also plausibly inier that: 
4 different discourses and their producers are non-communicating. 
This conclusion, however) surely po~es a dilemma for postmodernism and its 
crilique of Hlmk:mism. OLl lhe 011C baml, if Ji[[eI'~nl Ji~eoun;es and their 
pmdncf:rs arf: non-mmmlJn;cal'.ing, thf:n nn. on~ is in a. p(l!;itinn to confidently ~ay 
that there is no single meta-discourse - and thm argue that th~ project of 
modernigm is ml&conceived, In effect) undecidability across diJIcrcm discourses. 
unuermiIlt::l uefense of the (s.hared) claim that. there :lli no single meta-discourse. 
On [he ()l:h~T hand, if po~tmorl~Tnist~ ;Jgrt:'e that the modernist project is miscon-
ceived) then explicitly shared ground does seem to exist ben.veen discourses after 
all. 'i'his both raises doubts about the postmodcrnt.sf. crilique uf cssc[Jlialj~l 
modernism.I and suggests tha.t knowledge production may not be that closely tied 
to its conditions of production. 
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T think thi~ dilem ma mote difficult to discharge than many pU~llllodcfl:USI.3 
might suppose. In a sense, it is one member of the class of the ancien t on r.-;\nd-
~hf': -m~.ny or nnity-n.nrl-pluralit:y paradoxt:l-1 that fIrst received eSIJet:ially de.ar 
l;,xprt:"s~ion in CI)III1 ~()i(ln with Pla10'~ tl1F:ory of forms. Plato's problem was how 
instances of things dissimilar and yet related to one another each fell WIder some 
Lmivenal category representing thei r sha.r~ci q \lality. Here in its conter:npo' .-l.ry 
form the problem :is rnanif~t<:::d in lilt uual deJlland that discourses be dissimilar 
in nature, yet also share a common, motivating moment {that there is no meta-
discourse submming the m, the prqject of esse.nriaJist mod~rnNm}. The plurality 
sldt: of there being dive.rse discourscs is self-t:\i.UtI1l, Lul perhaps it seems odd to 
say that different discourses must share a unity in something's non-existence or 
in the absence of a meta-digcourse. To say, however> thal difftreJ\( di.~(:oIJr ~f. s an~ 
e;'H:h dissfwiall':d rl"llTTl fI. ~iflglc cxx~n.Lial.ist language is to l"Ilake UIlC impurlaul 
da.i.m abouL tlle origills and n ature of each, It is to 3ay that each possesses a 
specificity or particularity that derives from their like resistance t1) translatiull 
WlO one gnn~T~l laHg ll<tgl;". (lr logic:. Rllt thr.1l it i!li one general language that 
define~ them all, if only ill a m:gativc ~cn.'Ic. The di1emma at hand, then, 
concerns the nnpLications of emph<lslzing eith l:': r th~ p lurality or the. unity side.s of 
postmodernis111 '5 combil1ll1.g a defeme uf d.ivcl"~i.ty <\nd a 1l111t.uaJ dt'lr.andng from 
moderrust essentialism. 
Of course ail d.iLernroas are dispellable to the extent that one ;~ ".,.illing t.o 
r.mhrar:~ th~ mnsequ~nc~.'i of taking one horn or the other of 1111:: llile;:IIUll ii. roc 
fJOs lmociernists,l suggest., the p roCCs."l of futurc adjustment >vil.I require becoming 
clearer about the idea that discourses appear non.communicating. Sa}'wg: ili<tt 
different discourses are not hadcerl hy a r.omrnon meta-<liscourse make; 
discourses out lu be uon·wuunullit..:aling- ill only one specific. scnsc. Are there, 
then, other fonn~ of linkage or corrununicatlou between discourses compatible 
with thi~? And might these other [onus ul liuk<1.gf.: or r:omnmnir:.atinn preserve 
both the specificity of different discourses :in It:l"Im:i uf" lhei1" separate conditions 
of production and yet still support a critique of essentialist modernism ? S:lmlleli> 
wrmlrl allow that th~re an~ indeed forms of comm~uricaliun bt:!wl;c.I.I Ji .R;IJ~H·~ 
(I(her [han just th r. shan,:n n-jc:c:tion of a single meta-discourse, since h e does not 
embrace the conclusion of the reconstructed argument above that radical non-
communication is a necessary implir:ation of discourses having dive rse 
conditions uf Vl"Oduc..:tion. In sayil.lg how eke discourses ·c.ommunieatc1 then, we 
mi,~ht attempt to resolve the dilemma above by sho..,..,ing that there are linkages 
hNwf:f:n dif',tinr.t ciij;f,()ur:-eR that do not imply essentiali~t f:::J.t.p.gori~s. 
NOLe lllat an alternative resolution of Ult: dilemma. hert wuuld be simply to 
embrace non-communication in a radical fashion> thereby glyjng up the search 
for a form of communication between discourses <Lnd also a sharw c.: ri liq ut:! ur 
IfII)d f:rn is.t. mda-clisC":Ol II 'l'W_ In !:fi'cct, mOdCl"lltsnl would be defeated simply by lht: 
practice of individuals always operating in terms of self-contained discourses, 
rarher than by argument Thi~ nihil i!\t solution, however, seems an undeslrdble 
way of dispelling tho:.~ d,ilcmma r:.1.~:.I !1g jll"lst lllodc:rnism, chiefly because an articu-
late critique of modernist essentialism is pTellumably important to the defense o[ 
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diversity. But before developing this conclusion in the last section be1ow/ attention 
ought fir.<:t h I': givf':n In how ir: might. hI". t.hnllgh l. that. the dilemma set forth ai"xm: 
ha~ come: ahnlJl. hi s r J:)J"it~ally with llw f:1llf: r-gr:: n c;e.: (lr p(J~lmlJderIliSIll. 
My thesis here is that the dilenuna iacjn~ postmodernism has its origins in the 
way in which po!)tJT)oderni@ll historically developed as a critique of moclr.rni!'\m. 
SUPPO::H:: - lu tell a ::i liglltly apucryphal ::ilury - that scholars struggled for m.an)' 
years with the classic, m odernist correspondence problem regarding how our 
representations of the world relate to the v/Odd. These scholars' difficulty tor 
many years was that they believed there to be one underlying: n-.dli l>·, tIl( lug·h ' I.IIt')' 
iound themselvc~ committed to competing and often incommensurate ways of 
representing that reaJ.it}~ Finally after many years of frustration and fruitless 
debate over who~c rcprc~cntation of rc:ality ~ras C'o rl"l':ct, snrnF. :;;clll:ll ar':i- "::;,~CI"led 
that the idea of a. single, independent underlying reality must itself be contradic-
tory, because - reasonably enough - the idea o( a single reality is itself a 
d i~ursiVf: itr.ln, and all di~r; UI-:)i",'e: j (C::HI~ f.ll.l::i .~r:.S~ mulLiple senses. There only (":xi~t. 
- these P08Ln:oui::m il>U lh<:::n argueu - ui.fn~rt:Ul diocourst!s,-or.d ifferent modes of 
representation. But now the dilemma eme.rp;es. T hat it was originally thought 
lhal th t'l"t' nist gemu.ndy distinct, alternative: discourses depended on lht: itlt".a 
that> were there a sinp;le: unique underlying reality:. thcn there had to be a single. 
unique mode of representation of that reality. That is, the idea of the distinct-
ness Df a cliscow'M: was l'o[)Led in llie iuea. of ils pussiliit': IJfliq\Jt-:n~ss ;t:-; thf:'" only 
correct representation of a 31ng1c rcality. Yct if we now say that no w lg'h;, Llmler-
Jying reality exists, then the past basis for saying that discourses are genuinely 
d ixl.ilU:1. ami d ifft'.Tt'.1It from ont"o ;.motht'.r h;.t~ bl;'f;'.n rem oved. M oreover, unless new 
criteria lor exvlailling' llic iura or i.li:sliJl(;Ults:; a.nd dilferem:e are developed, it 
canno t be ruled out that discourses are more alike than different from onc 
<iIlllthcl" - a <.b·dopmt:nt whidl might irollic.:ally then r:ni":ouragr: nt":(JJn(,df'.rnisls 
lo argue that "different" discourses tend to, say, "converge» on d .... c ~!corrcct" 
representation of a singk> lmderlyin,~ reality.2 
On this vie\v, much C"ufl"tnt posLlllodeJ'I:llSm pn"_,\t:rvt:s, if ill a l:-l t.t:IlL 'If implicit 
manner, an important presupposition of mooc:m i.":m in that. pn.": J.Il1 !)d f':r l ( j.~IT"~ 
concept of dilterence as unlqueness is an inadvertent inheritance from 
1rI(I( l f~ Tllis rrl. lJlli f JlI t!n~s.'\, it s~~ms ra ir t.o SiiY> i') ;.In essentialist notion in that it 
depends on lhe idea of a ~i.IJgle COlTt$!JoJlue;:m .:t; lu a :si.ngle: reality, To say some-
thing is unjque i.nvolves making a complete and comprehensive survey of the 
world, in order LO say that one and one thing only occupir:s a t"":t':"rta.in pl:'J.c:f'" in 
that ",,"orld, nut postmodernists need not explain differel1ce in terms of the Idea. 
of uniqueness. T here are other ways of explaining- thc concept of diflercnce that 
postlnonl":"rnism might.li.dnpt - way!'\ whit~h w~ \v(II Jld hope would HlHkt speaking 
about differcnec compatihle with. jointly dr.Jlying a .'lingle mc:ta-rfis(,;OI ll'."f': f'::<i .<;ls, 
sustain the critique of modernism, and thus serve to dispel the dilenuna abov\.':. 
\'\'hal. this s lJgg(>;.<;.t~ is t.ha t. for prn;t.moof':rnist t.hinking to be sl.IccessfiJJ it needs to 
hI': dahol"atf:d indt':l~ndl':"lly or thili. r:r ;tiflll~ or ltll)r.lr:nl;:5H.1. tlml ~p("t.:i!kally tn.·a ls 
discourses as self-con tained and non-communicating. "\Vhat ia rather needed, 
more specjficall)~ is an account of discourses' relative autonomy from om: 
HiU ]ok .. H. iJavis 
another, ,~ince an acc:mmt nf this sort would presumably make a discourse s 
lli::;lim.: lues:; a function of its laleral jIlXI<lJ.1~l$iti.on to oth~r dhcourses, rather than 
a function of its possession of the e~<:.entia1 i s t property of uniquene::.s. I now turn 
tu lim ... such an account might hP. ~ttempted. 
Identity conditions for discourses 
If essentialist reasoning tries to explain r epresentation in terms of correspon· 
dence to something 111':'YOI)(\ l 'I': prt::~r:. I1If\liou. !lull-essentialist rea:;oning strives to 
remain "i.t.h.in the ambit of Tcprrst:ntatlon, that -is} it strives to account lo r 
tlistim.:t forms of represental.ion ill t~nns of the whole. of representation or in a. 
holistic manner. Thi-l involves explaining' the relative autonomy of diflCrcnt 
discourses by referenr:r: to r.he principles that accomlt for the houndarir:!\ hr.twcc: n 
discomses l where focusing' UIJ llle dividing lines bern'een different rusco urs("!s 
makes thr.ir di!: r:inc:tness a ftmction of their relation to one another. Holistic 
reasoning. that is, opt.:ratcs in terms of concrete wholes whosf: palTI are from fJh': 
outset the (internai) determinations of those ,",,"holes. /\ concept of dillcrcnec 
dcvdopr.rl along flw"~~ liur.::s dues not tradC': in thl': f:onf: r:pt (lr IJn;qJIt":Jl e:'S ~ , :s.i..t ll: t: 
the whole's parts .- here different discourses are different from one another as 
r",.lat:e.d pa.rt )!. ()r une whole - or of discourse generally. Dillerence is understood 
immanently, as it were, ra ther than absolutely. 
H ow specilicaJl); then, should the boundaries between discourses Ix: concep-
tualized? \V11ell we:: !ipeak of boundaries beLweeH things WI-: ~1Jppmif': w t:. are 
f:lmlllm,n eotlsly concerned \o\.;th those boundaries and the distinct and -identiliable 
thiHgS l.iJOSI": bOlln daries permit us to distinglli!\h. Fllrther, to say that one has 
some clistinct and identifIable item is to say lhal um; oou)d clalxrrat~ identity 
c:onditions for that item whic:h 'ioIIllllld allow U'l to distinguish and reidentify that 
tlii ng in a vt.l.Tiety of senings and through r.hangr. ill lil t: wtly we taJk a.Luu( thing'!'. 
Identity conditions, that is, are criteria used for singling out, identifying, and rela-
beling l!Jjug~ we want tD pay f:p~d ~ 1 <1llculiull to, and rdlect the implicit 
ontologies of the 1a.n~age wc cmploy. To say that there are identity conditions 
fur discomscs, then, is to :lay lllaJ. th l":n~ ar~ criteria for singling out, identifyi ng, 
and relabeling different discourses. T h e business of doing this, moreovcr, both 
establishes the bO\lndari ~~ ht': twr:en di~course~ ffild determines thc relative 
autonomy or identity tilaL c..Iilli::n::nl ili:;cuunes may be said to possess. 
or COUr!le. t.rylng to say what makes one discourse distinct from another is a 
herculean task, sine!":, ill C:Olltn L"t. to tangible. things such as a t.able wh~f': vlslUil 
outline and tactile qualities offer us obvious starting points, discoUl''Scs are 
changing (".ol1 (':c: t.ion~ (lr rdatively elusive (:onc:c:ptual movf':~ and practices that 
may well scem to lack any apparent identity 'Nhatsoc\'cr:~ Nr:mr:thr:lr:sf:, T slIggc:.::.i 
tllM t.hf. rf':l;.'J.(ivt: aulonumy ()r identity of dio;col..U":'les b~ llnrl f!r~tooc1 in terms of 
the functional roles played u>· lwo different types of copcepts o{X:raliBg in allY 
giv-en disc:our!w., where rhese two t)"lJes of conccpr.s are distingu ished according to 
thc contdbutiom they make to a cfucow-se's wlily amI disl. illC : IJ w_~ r~l)pf:':ctivdy. 
Firn!'., ('very di5COlrrse possesses concepts and notions which we may i.4{re~ are 
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cUllral tU or consrirutive of that discourse. Like core concepts in Ltkatn!:i<1.11 
research programs, these concepts an d notions may be thought key to that 
rlisr.o n ,.~'s uni(y (\ !i all i<.k:ulifiabk o:.~oun:~ in the sellse uf being llDlqur. to th"il.t. 
discourse. Second, every discourse also pos~esses concepts and notions which, 
I hc,ug·l I IIOll;UllslituLiv~ of its unity or specific to that d isoo\tr':ie, nonethe1es~ play 
a role in that discourse, Unlike in the k"1.katosian conception, thcse lattel; non-
com;litllt,ive concep~ may be reg·arded as boundary-lllarkr.T!i, sinef: thf:)' 8.l'r hot,h 
louuc..l ill uLlier J~CUlln;~ and yet still playa role in the discourse under consider-
Mion. As opposed to explaining the unity of a discourse, thcsc latter eoncr.pl:s 
lIIay he lUlderstood as Uleans by ",,'hich we establiSh the distuu:lll!"::C;x til' a given 
di~oour:.e. In effect, the), enable us to pick out just where tJlt~ d:iscoursc in qucs-
tion cO,mes into contact "",ith other discourse~ . 
BULh kinds of concepts, then, are necessary to cxplaining the relative 
autonomy or identity of a discourse in terms of its unity and distinctiveness ii."om 
other discourses. An example m ay help elarify this conception. Tn pns.t.-K~ynf.$i"'H 
discourse the notion of true uncertainty is reg-drded as a constitutive element in 
~f..J.uilibriwll tulell1.ploymem arguments. In neoelassical-s>'ntht:sis K"lm:xi;.JTI 
discourse the notion of ri.gid wages L': regarded as a constitu tive dement in equi-
librium unernployrnentargum~nts. Each conC:f:pt, thm, r.nntrihllt.p.~ to Ihp. IInity of 
these two Keyncsian di~cOllrW!i. 1n contrast, the concept of au um: lllploymt: ..nl 
equilibrium, though it i ~ e:mployp.d in hoth poot-Keyne.c;.i<lo and neoclassicaJ-
synthesis Keynesiao. discouJ"st, is oon:sululivt: uf tht; ullily of neither argument 
As a concept, it thus contributes to our picking· out the boundary between the 
two klTlliS of argunH':n t. Til dfFrl:, if ' ~ rlilTF.rF.1l1 ial riH.lly)pria.tiun iu. lhc. two 
discourses tclh us where the two discour::;cs both eomc into c.ontact and yet 
rf':main di.~ l iJld. 
Some, perhaps, will think this conception of a discourse with t.wo different 
types of concepts cumbersome and l.mnecessary to explaining the relati.v~ 
autonomy or iuenli ly uf Jiscount:~. 'rV'by HoI simply explain what makes 
discourses cfutinct and dille rent in terms of their constitutive notions alond Tilc 
11Il lhh~ 1 1I wi'-h pnu: ...  edillg in this mannt;:r is that it l{'.avc~ us with postmoderni'ml':': 
apples and oran~es, non-communication problem. If a discourse's constitut ive 
wncepts are spedfic to that discOtrrse alone, then in attr.nciing ~oldy 1:0 thf'm we 
lack u way of relating discourses to one another. H owever, in differcn tiating 
bet\'\'een a SIngle discourse's constitutive and non-cons.titutive concepts we put 
ourselves in a position to explain that di~r.oUl"3C '!\ -identity !ipr:r. ific.ally a~ a ff': l<l fh:e 
autonomy, or as an autonomy relative to other discow'SCs. 'lbe key to this 
(:{)Ucepcion, it should now be apparent, is in being able l(l:'lay thai. hUlll I.YJl(~ or 
concepts must operate in any given discourse. Not just a diseourse:s constitutive 
concepts, but also its assoc.iated penumbra of non-mmtitl.1 t.ivp. c()nc:~prs must: be 
sccn as nccessary to the understanding of that discourse. 
O f r:nm!w., s::lying 1.hal: nnn-c.on~tiT.lltive concepts are as necessary to a 
discotU'Sc as afC it:l cOnStilu!.iv{: f:OIlt:t:JlL'I ~Ollll(l'i. Deltl, hul II .... " i.;; :iJl entirely 
reasonable view to adopt if discourse is understood holistically. Then, though 
c.omt.inltivr: c.onr:{'pto; ill'l"; r.pl";l~i fi{'. to indivi(] Jm.l di.~(!)~u ·:sr.:~) lhey ~(ill w!t:d to bt 
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umlcrSlUOU as operating in 00l1jUfl t; liuu wilh a further appanltus of concepts that 
are not specific to that discourse. Holistic reasoning generally operates with 
complex wholes which may not be ~muku wilhuu( ut.:slroyiug lhe whole, 
and wi. it:h a lso :1t :(:()mmodate differenr. fimctions for different r. lemen t<: in those 
whoJf'~I;;. H ere: 11 lS suggested that constitutive n otions aCC01lll t Jor discW'Sivc unity 
and nOll-comililuLiY~ notions point to discursive boundaries that together cxpl~ 
the rdative autonomy or identity of discomses. 
Docs th.is conception, then, help us addTess the non-conununication cWcmma 
advanced above? The foUowillg ~ecljoll allcrnpts to answer thi::; question in a 
positive way by considering a rather different set of ~'Tounds for operating in 
terrns of the approach outlined. it has been ::;uggc::sleJ. fur txa.rnpl~ by Deirdre 
j\'kClulikey (1994)J that cliscoufse~ and those who ll Sf: l:h l':rTI r:ommllnic.(l.te much 
in the way that economic actors interact in market::;, and comcqucntly that we 
can dcydup an understanding of di.::;cur.siw: intr:rar.tirm or how disc.nlln:\e.~ 
cCJ[]IIt1IJl1iC:(lI.~ ;Tl terms of a mood of marke.t. pxrha.mre.. \¥('; t.hllS hlrn to the 
market exchange model of discursive interaction in an ~£fort to dctcrmine what 
more we might learn abouL wHuflUlllcation from this perspective. 
Market exchange and discursive interaction 
1\,{arkets typically involvt<! ne.cf!ntra1i7.ed exchange beh· .... een economic agents 
spel:ialized in different types ()f pn....-lu c:tion wirhin ~Il overall d,v~ioJl Qf l~bor. 
N/:'.or;la!3slcaJ economic the.ory gif.nf!rally gives the idea of exchange a decidedly 
modernist interpretation by representing economic agents as atomistic individ, 
uats, each will i their uvm wd1-ddined endowmenls amI axlOlfialically dl~~CTit}f-';(! 
preferences, whose exchange "villi one another generates gains from trade for 
each; a.:. if lhruugh the mechanism of an invisible h and. Tak..iug Ll I~ a.s a rnmld 
for th:: illtt: ral :l.iuli of different discourses, a neodas.<;ic:ist might then ~my that 
though inn ivirl1l aJ discoune producers eaeh have their own linguistic cndow-
ments and conccptual preferelK.t':3, llleir mSl:univc; trade and interaction with 
one anOilif:f ref1f':C': t ~ an llnderlying logic or meta-discourse that to neoclassical 
economists worb much like how universal constrained optinlization results in a 
general equilibrium between imlcpcIlIleul producers. Just as, that is, seemingly" 
veey different economic agents' trade with one another reflects one, underlying 
meta-discourse of bade that may be e<ljJluroo in sels of ~quations whose joint 
w lutiun can be proven to exl!'it, :10 that rl i sc.o ll t'!'i~ and their producers generally; 
on the tTaditional neoclassicaJ model of market exchange, preswnably 5hare a 
couunOJl meta-language or deep grammar that makcs conuuunlcalio ll p~ilJlt: . 
Thf'.re :tre ways, bmvever, to repre.sf:nt markf:t e.xr:h:m ge as a model Jor discur-
sive interaction that bypass the modcrni3t :features of thc neoclassical accouuL 
Distinguish.ing bt:l WCCll ~{ethodolog}' and methodology a~ d( l~ 1vk Ooskr.y 
( IQQ4), " ..... e 1T.1ight say that di!i(;unJive trade and interaction a.re not guidf: rI hy;m 
underlying logic or 11lda-ui~t:ount: but rather by multiple, evolving llonn.s of 
eonvc:rsatiOll. IIT11t:n: is no "Methodology of economics ... only sllstaim:ci 
verbal and "vrittr.n intcm.f'.tion which defies ab-stract characterization, because it 
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is inherenl in the wHivoitiauly CUIu:reltc n;laliomhips obtaining beh ...... een 
f:c.onomists" (Davis ) 990: 33). One reason to think this is that there is growing 
c,\';dcnec that economic agents are not appropriately all modeled as individual, 
consrrau'led optilllizCl'N eadl overating williill a gr.ut:.ra l r.Q ll lli hrillm. Thus 
psychologists haw: argut:d that human dt:cision making ofifm no~!\ not satisfy the 
axiomatic requirements of neoclassical theory (cf Thalcr L 992). c lhit:isLs have 
;jrgueo (hat individuals in markets often aet from non-!::eJf-regarding, non-ut.iJity-
enhancing) altruistic motives ~e.g.) Sen HJ~ 7)j feminists have argued that power 
and p atriarchy socialty detennine the actions of " .... omen and mcn (perber and 
Nel~oT1 1993}) and a range of heterodox economists see class, corporate power, 
cu lture, social values., and a variety of other explanation:; of behavior as being 
celltrally invotveu ill markets. Nom:: or lht:st::: lypt::s uf cxplanations are neatly 
suited to producing a modernist determinacy in Lhe analysis of exchange in 
markets. 'l'his strongly suggests that there arc good rC::U:;OIlS to Ldit:vc lhu.l market 
participants do Ilol ~ lla.n~ in a slngle hig-lu:r logic ill 1.l1t: il' !'r:specliv~ in t.f':riu:tioos 
with one another, and that we acoordingly ought to attend_more carefully to 
different and changing forms of behavior in market activity. nut if this is the 
case, then modeling d.i~cursive interaction a.~ marht r:xchangf. 1n t~rm.<; of Ii 
formal synuneo-y of behaviors explicable in terms of a single mathematics is 
euLirely misguided. Rather, ...... e should seek to explain the changing and often 
incompatible means by which very different dis(;UISive agents negotiate 
exchangC$ WiUl om; anulher wililuut :; ujJpo~il1g that a dettrrminate formal appa-
ralU:i Li~s ht:hind ti lt-: I] IfIcwtt' p llt'J lulIlt'Tla. 
Hd orf': r:omlrlf':ring how to go aocmt. thls, howeverJ we should note one very 
tangible advantage to U3ing concepts of market exchange to model tli~t:UllljVt: 
interaction. Saying that inoivirllla.ls ann rli !':C':Ollr.~f.~ interact v-ith one another 
much in thc way tllat market paItieipants engage in cxchang-e .implies. that 
somehow discourses do succeed in comnmnieating despite their (JrigirlS ill vr:ry 
different conditions of production. Indeed, this eondusion i.'l only reininrr:f.d 
shuuLd we agree that) contrary to much traditional thinking in ncoclassical 
t:conomics, th~re is no single meta-logic underlying real-world ~ark.et eXfbangf:. 
T hen the fact thAt exchange does occur tells us that economic aF{ents' particu-
larity is compatible with their dllicun;lve luleml(iuH. TIlt:: lask UII:l l ooIlfi:onts us, 
the.n , 1!': to explajn jus.t how discursive particuhuity is compatible 1,4,rith discursive 
intcraction understood as a kind of trade. An example applying the discoun;e 
analysis developed .in the lasl section is sugga;tivc. 
Consider hOU!'ir".hoLd r-,Xc-lIangf: lli!twr:e:n womf:n and m~n in ahll!uve nome')tic 
violence relationships where trade is treated as 3. form of discurs ivl.: iuh:racliul1 . 
On the vie w above, constirutive and non-r.onstitutive r:onr:r.pr.'\ charac.r.e.rizp. thf': 
respective discourses. of women and men. How m ay wc undcrstand domestic 
violence in marriages involving production sp ecialization and exchange ill terms 
of these two kinds of concepts? Farmer and Tiefr.nthalC":r (19Y7) f'.xplain 
domestic violence In non-cooperative relationships where men derive u tility from 
violtll<':c agaiu.s L WOIlleIl, amI WOfIH::ll uerive uliliLy liurn n:al income received in 
exchange. \'Vhile the Farmer-Tie±enthaler analysis expbins the behavior of both 
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women and men formally in terms of a single mathematics of con.s trained 
oplimh:alioll) we may d~Jlart from and reinterpret their l..ltility analysis to dilJer-
entiate two distinct discourSe3 in L~c dillen:lIl arguments of women alii ) men's 
n::spct:tiv~ utility functions. Only men, not women, derive utility hUIll viokuu: 
pc::rpetrated agaills l women. Thus WP. may say that constitutive of the discourse 
o f men engaged in spousal abuse .is a :;d . of conccpls Lhat I ic sl"';l f-t:'$(e('.m to 
spousal abuse. In contrast, women may be said to understand lheir :>LaLUK as a 
product of paJ ri;t n:h),. Th~ c:onct:pt of patriarchy is constitutive of their 
discourse. Thus though formally each may be .~ a.ici to haVf': ul ility fUIlctiom, a 
morl!': r.on rrete an.:llysis of their preferences gives us a b as,U; fur :mying that they 
r.ar.h 111i ..... <;t': ~.~ <t oore of 8pecilic t:OrH:epts '(hat make thf.ir di ~('.ourses hig-hly incom-
mensurate with one another. 
At the same time, howev'er, there arc non-constitutive concepts in the 
ruSt:UltrSC of each which 'l.\"'e specific to nelther discourse, but which work 
together with each one's constitutive concepls. Here 1-ve may i't ft:J' to n,mcepts 
which each possesses that concern such things as the value of family :t.r lf.l hum!;, 
the:: imporlaJ Jct: of joim incoml.':, f:ultural e.xpectatio ns about married life, desire 
for c.om panionswf,) , and so on.'! A'S [lUI1-{.Qnstimtive, lhi~ h!.lj:~r set of ronef:ptc; 
operates dillet'endy for women and men according to how the)' ' l::-Sptx..1ivdy inte-
grate tht:JlI l('\gcl.lier with (hust: concepts constitutive of their two respective 
discourses. Thus womcn may understand the Me.riru;t::) lo abu:>t': th~y flla.kC 
r~r~onany for family and children as part and pa.n.:d of living in a pall'ian:fl :i.1 
~(I(:ir.:ly. Alte mativd):, a l.1lIsive and violent me.n may see family and children as 
further aspects of th eir OWII sdf-magnifi("a(.ifJU. Eacll f:on.~q1J C':ntly sh.,·lres a set of 
(non-constitutive) concepts, but those concepts function dilferc:ntly for each in 
lWo disuncl tiisCi mrses. Thus thr:ir tWD discourses are relatively autonomous and 
identi£ab1c by having both a dhLiuli core of concept<; ami hy sharing conrf:pt.~ 
tha t mark ou t the points of contact or boundaric.", y,.;th fin \,,: ;1 . rlolh(;~I: 
Th !": F'rl.rmer-Tief\":nt.haler analysis also explains the breakdown of abusivc 
l'c1ationship~ and the terwillation of exchang~ hetween !.he women and men 
involved in rJle m in terms of a thres.hold or threalvuiul at which WDilleJl c~a~·a·: to 
ao.:,r.:p l the l11:'lrr'j;:!.ges combination of real-income Lransfers and spousal abuse. 
III uur framc-.voI'k, lfJe respective di!':cnlJr~~ of women ano mf:n cease to commu-
nic.a te. Wc might say, ming the .liar·lIlt:J,-Tiefe::nthalcr crll!lha).,j~ on women's 
shdtt':r~ alld Sl'pport nctworkc; a.~ a form of real incomc, that in these eircum-
stancc~ wOOlt:n':-; diswur!'l~ drl)p~ (hose Df}n~nnstlnl1ive concepts shan~rl w il.h 
m en regardin~ family and home. and adds ncw nf1n-c.o n~ 1 il.U l.i.vt~ coIK:(':pn shan:::u 
willi (I,l lt!r abuse victims regarding personal security and non-patriarchal family 
hfr.. On lht: assumption LJlal. I:c.)~, constitutive c.onCt":pts nil! help loc:aJ.c: ditfcrent 
discourses specitic to different groups o f \",'om e. n if I shdter and SUpp nl1. Ild w(,rlt"s , 
!'l::t~ conceptc; re:gardlng class, education, and so cial advantagcs t then discursive 
iulcracoon J'eeJIJt-; rg [·~ wh en diffen:nt ,"vomen's discourses diHerenLly integrate 
their respcctive core, constitutive conceyb \ .... itL their shat·t d, IltlTl-(omtitutive 
": DnCf':pt~) which mark out points of eontacl and boundarics betvveen relatively 
autollt'JLlHltlS lli!'coul"ses within ~l)tlter and support nenvorks. 
I 
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Using a markr.t modd of d:isCOllTl!C, tlu.!.Il, J i!;;l:w·si\·e:: im eraeLlol1, like:: tt.:Ollomic 
exchange) is periodic, interrupted, and shifting-. Indeed, we may further oomp1i-
rare the pic:hlTI; a:hovt: in two ways. First, on <l posCIDodem view of di.scourse as a 
form of exchange. discursive parties presuma bly (Tilde al w allY .sites: ill the 
process simultancously reconstituting themselves in a varie ty of ways as they 
integ'rate "II,ltiplt $els nf >;haJ\':d, n(IIH-:on5htutivt': (",()n(",~pts '\o\.J.th their constirutive 
Ul Jt:,s. Se::cum], Jlothing ill t11t: analy~is here requjres that oore -consrituti\,(: 
concepts be unchanging. '10 the extent thal we a rc successful in characterizin~ 
LUIlccpts specific to ~ discourse: c..:uIJ~L il.l lliVf: (~nJlr.C': pl·~ p(,s~es~ a d"'gr~ of 
'SlauiliLy. But clt:arly UII lite exeha.nge model of dis(;ursWc interaction the abun-
dance of contacts between discourses argucs for change in core, constitutive 
concepts. Of course discomse.s also die (lml art'; llf)rtl . Wit ho ut, (JJ . I .t~rnpllTlg to say 
hm.... changing interaction Lelwt:eH J.i::;cuur~CJ in. tenllS of non-constilutive 
concepts impacts on core concepts) we may simply say that the continual resiting-
of di~ruJ'!':ivt" int1":ranion mntributf:s to the elimination, crealion, and transfor-
malion of discourses. 
Thus thcre is considerable lUldecidability and indeterminacy in the frame-
work. developed here to explain tbe relative. a.u t.o nomy and identity of disc.oIJTsa. 
Yt"t Ihis 1J1H 1~cicl;{hilil y :iflll iHdl~ l.t:rlll imu;y lltjther QVe.rttu'ns that framework, nor 
leaves U8 with the non-c.ommunication diJcmma :set out abovc. Discourses do 
cOirun unica tc with one a nmher without rec:UlU"SI! lu a sillglt lJItt 't-dj~wu l"St (;.tS 
individuals may interact in markets w:i(hont ;1 TI~lIdax." il ..,.. 1 ~ 1I · rnal i s.rn) , a wl yel. 
d iscourses may still be understood in terms of their distinct conditions of 
pmrlu('; tio n. D ocs this fram~work,. then, offer solid grounds. fo r sustaining the 
[11:):'; lm~"rl~nl r.J'itiq1J1': of c:s.<;e:nriali<;m~ The al1~n'Vt'I" to uus quc:slioH (.;au ptrliaJ.>:) 
b cst b c given by comparing nihilism and relativi3T11. 
NihillSJD, relativislD., and the politics of 
postrnoderni!'ill'l. 
'''''hat is nihilism? In their reccnt clisClls~ion of K~yTlt!"', JrI.( :k Armuiglin am] DavLd 
Ruccio (19Y5} take Kr..YllCS' late emphasis on animal spirits and lU1ce:rtainty as an 
impenetrable barrier to calculative rationality, and thus as an important post-
mode rn C': 1f'.ln l': J1 1 in Kf'.vJ1l':s' t.hinking that helped inlroduce ind eterminacy and 
undt:d dauili ty iJJlO conlempo.rary economic discoUJ1)c. Thcy sec thls as part of 
"a progrfOssive slide into nihili'im" on KC.)11~~ ' part., hut argue that Kt:yn~ should 
be prL-lised r~theT lhan UlI1cle.nlllnl fur il..a (;eJ1t':ral ly, th!".n, nihili~rn for Amafigiio 
and Ruccio and many postmoderrllils is the view th a.t discoursc is always incom-
plete: fr agmen ted, and laden with indeterminacy. Em br(lcil.1g nihi lism thll.<:: 
means rejecting the modcrnis( practice (If Irier<lfchically pri\.ilt!g·illg- t1Ll.l t:,· (IV!": '· 
cli~ol'(kr, and rceogllizing thatattcmpt:i to "domesticateH Wlcertainty are ultimatdy 
doom cd to taiJ (also d Amariglio and R uccio 1994). 
Thi s. vi~w would ~e.C':m to imply that the discursive world cannot be made up 
of uilrt:.r~nl, I'tla.Lively self-contained discourses, si.nce to suppose dill would be to 
'Posit some dcgree of order over thc disord.er. \'Vhlle Amariglio and Rnccio, as 
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weD as other postmodernists \,!ho have voritten on nihilism, are more disposed 
Lowa.nJ llt~ idt:i:I or di;Jlog bety./een d istinct. relatively self-contained discourses 
than the characterization of nihilism here would seem to suggest (cf. Amariglio) 
Resnick, and WoUf 1990; Rm;{;iu 1991), it is nonetheless insmu.:thre to consider 
the consequences of nih.ilism lor the dilemma set forth in this chapter. Thus, 
were uncertainty and lUldeci.J~biIity pcrvasM:, it \oVOukl. fullow lila !. t.:ullJmunit:a-
tion ann sharr.n understanding bern"een different postmodernist cUscourses 
would Hot obtain. In the: thi nking rl(".'{r:'op~~1 ;.tbovJ;., it wotd(1 not male liCIJ..~C III 
say that th~c rl i !!COlJrflf~ ~h;).red a. set of non-.c.ons{ih.ltive concepTS pe.rtaining to a 
shared critique of modcrui..:HIl. In c.:Ifccl, 011 a IW.I.i.!.i.sl view diversity swamps 
common ground. But t hif. jars with t.hf' Povirlent mmmon grounl"l postmodernist 
discourses sharc against mOdernl8-ill. 
There is a related consequence of embracing pervasive indeterminacy and 
undecidability. If disorder always conquers O1'del~ so tllat one can never hope tu 
"dom~~~ticate" .~pherf:s of rliscour:;;;f':, thf':n ditlerence- dominates coherence abso-
lutely. Radical uncertalllty understood in this wa)" then: inverts the completenes,;; 
and fmality sought in modern ist rationality, :;;;;nce. it ~till daims that the.rr: is one, 
single reality (charactcrjzcd now in terms of univcrsal frL\gmcntation and 
()mnipresent disorder), and still propos~s to work in rerms of a singlr. Ia.ngll ag~ 
(that of indeterminacy and undecidability}. Nihilism, as argucd abovc in COWICC-
lion with the historical origins of the (':on(:t;pl of Jjnr . .r~ll(;t: ill l",:-;tJIII HJt:nlism, 
simpJy works in terms of an altcrnative set of absolu tc5. In cth:et, it opposes core 
concepts of indeterminacy and c:Iisol,~r t.o mf,op.rnj~m 'l': (:nrl": .-,on('.1":111;<.; (,r dt:kr'-
minacy and order, but shares non-constitutive, boundary conccpts of a single 
In.nguage and a single realit)~ Postmodnnism lInd~r!'-;t()()(j in th~~r: Ir.rms i ~ ;:) form 
of discurslve interaction with modernism, rathcr than an internally differenti-
ated wbole of posrrnodernist voices relatively autonomous c:hir.fly in r~pf.c:t to 
one anoth er. 
I lhink the latter form of postmodernism - tha.l is. ODe tltal di[fer~nLialc.s l'mL-
modernist voices relative to one another rather than relative to modernism - is 
lil t: I.lrd~lTl;d our~. And in place of nihilism, I also recommend postmodern.isb 
adopt what was earlier labeled a principled rclativ-isID. On this conception partic-
ular diocourses possess tcmpofmy and rdativc st.ahility that. r:nahks th l":ir 
r:ompilrative invest(g;a tion, though nothing in this :mg.~estg they can be arranged 
ill ~JJy kind of hierarchical order. \Vha[ can instead be achk\lcd i~ a t:rtJ:-.. .... -
discourse type of .investigation that bui1d<: an account of diflerr.na:~ hr:tween 
cliscourst::s in lCfIrI:S of their differential appropriation (vi a their respective OOtlsti-
tnrive concepts) of sbared non-constitulive concepts. Generali}) then, 
conullUlUcatioJl js rclaLivc Lo the discuurse in wbich one operates, just as Samuels 
argued. Rut our abiliry to explain the relative character of d iscourse turns on the 
principles involved in reading itcross discourses here ticcl up with the treatment 
of comhn It)ve ~nd non-constitutive concepts. Thus a principled rdativi~m offp.n 
postmodcrnism a means of preserving an emphasis on undecidability and indc-
It:l"mifl<lc}, wl1il~ tiho in!;uring a form of comrmmication belween differ~nt 
poslmodcmlsL a.fJpruac1J,:.;~ . 
Posimoikrnism and ide7lliry (.(}nditions 167 
)J ihil j~m, in contrast, suffer.') at least n .... o importan t Vl.llnerabilities as a po~t­
modernist a.pproach. In thc first placc, discursive exchange a.nd interaction 
chiefly will i IfIOtlt:r ll i:-;1fI is ufll i k~I}' 1.0 .s~n.'t::1S lUI dTc:c: l.i \,l~ ( ;J"ili(IU~ of modenIism, 
since - on the model of discursive interaction adopted here - the core concepts 
specific to mode.rnlsm are not lI() Lit~eabL )' a t ri&k wht:u 1Iihili.'i1U alii I IlIodt~nl ism 
discwsively interact over shared commitment to a single (though dillerent :for 
each) language and rcalit)o: No doubt com"inccd modenUsts, pe.rhaps IltoI I1UU-
ernists, will say that gaps, discrepancies, undecidable moments, and so on are 
.iust a part of an inC'_xorahlc progrt~~ toward knowlcdgr.. Tn th ~ ~r.r:onrl placf'.., 
focusing on the rdatiomhip hr.hvf'.r.n postmodf;rni:'lm and mocierni~m rid,racts 
£i-om attention to multiple interactions among multiple cl.i3C()W'SC~. BIll aLLl:tlLiuIl 
to the latter is not only important for understandIDg the dynamics of discourses 
- what might be thought the positive project in pO:JOTIodernism - but also for 
simply demonstrating- that there exists no single, m eta-cliscourse. 
Thill last po.int is a valuable onc to conclude upon. Onc dlll1cnslon of post-
modernism t.hat especially desf:rves emphasi." i" th~ form -of its pnliticaJ 
progress.ivenes~. \\'hile hj~torically Enlightenment modernism was politicall)T 
progressive in defending rights of individu.als against theocratic power, today 
poslmudernism is politically PTO.~essi.V'e i.n defending roJe.ranc.e and openness 
<-Igain~t. modern bureaucratic rationality. fudeed, the defense of diversity and 
pluralism appean to be me chief p ractica1 consequence of posbnodernist 
<.fut;VltJ1it:. That probrram, in its many aspeclli and dimr.nsiol1s, sr.~ms wdl scrveci 
by exhibition and analysis of the variety of fortrul of discourse and their modcs 
of disC1lfSive iIlteraclion. The argument in this chapter attemp~ to map out 
some of this dynamic. 
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Notes 
I lor economics, in porticuiar, see the col.lection of papers in Samuels (1990;-. 
'2 Hau~man's (19Y~) treatment of economics as a n ine:o:act science might be Wlde:rstood 
ill these l.el'lu.:s. 
3 It is worth pOi..rl!.iu.~· out iliat l.here ate many i(t: lus just as atllOlV llO W> as dil"iCUUI"&;S ill 
regard to identicy thai we customarily u\":al: a~ distinct and fcident.illaWe. Fluw till: 
social world, for example, tlK:re are one's moral obligations, a Gel·tam group's employ-
ment prospects, the legal rights to those accused of crimes, jX>litical platforms, 
t.u:;loruS, and so HO, Sttmingly in a li"ol alrnl:t-i l ,,,,; thout limit. Inrleoo, most of t.he 
"lhiugs" ...... t arc inlcrc.s1:t:u in suciallift: ]mvc Td lhcr intrdt:lablt: idt:nti.£y c:onrutiollS. 
That we nonetheless deal with them regularly as distulC't and reidenti.£i.."1blc implies we 
have coherent means of doing ·50. 
4 NotE': th::l.t l'I ll th~e items m:.ly he fr:uneri in lltilily terms . 
. '"i C:orlrlingtfln (19A2) initi::ltr.rl thiO nihili~m c:rit1 rr!l~ of Kc:ynr:~ ;;.nrl Sh:H.:kle, bllt spoke of 
it pcjorativcl);: 
1GB John B. Davis 
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